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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 16-2776 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM PERRY BAGLEY,  
     Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 2-14-cr-00098-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Gustave Diamond  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 20, 2017 
 
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 30, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 William Bagley appeals his judgment of conviction for counterfeiting Federal 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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Reserve notes, claiming that evidence admitted against him was obtained pursuant to a 
defective search warrant. Because we conclude that the warrant was not defective, we 
will affirm. 
I 
 In May 2013, the United States Secret Service began an investigation into the 
passing of counterfeit $100 Federal Reserve notes in Pennsylvania. After a confidential 
informant and two cooperating suspects implicated Bagley in the scheme, Magistrate 
Judge Eddy issued a search warrant for the apartment he occupied with Sherita Howard. 
The subsequent search of Howard’s apartment turned up evidence of counterfeiting, 
including counterfeit bus passes and associated printing equipment. Bagley was indicted 
for counterfeiting and conspiracy to counterfeit and pass fraudulent Federal Reserve 
notes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, §§ 471–72. 
 Prior to trial, Bagley moved to suppress the evidence seized from the apartment, 
arguing the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be searched. The warrant 
referenced an “Apt #2” on the “second floor,” but the apartment searched was actually on 
the third floor. Bagley Supp. App. 115; Gov’t Supp. App. 44. Accordingly, Bagley 
contended that his apartment was number 3, not 2. The District Court disagreed and 
denied the motion to suppress, finding that the warrant described the apartment with 
sufficient particularity. Alternatively, the Court held that the good faith exception applied 
to deny suppression of the evidence. 
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 After his motion to suppress was denied, Bagley entered a conditional plea of 
guilty on the counterfeiting and conspiracy charges, preserving the suppression issue. The 
District Court sentenced Bagley to 41 months’ imprisonment on each charge, to be served 
concurrently, along with $14,300 in restitution and assessment fees. Bagley timely 
appealed on the suppression issue alone. 
II1 
 
 The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Bagley 
asserts that the warrant did not describe his apartment with sufficient particularity because 
it misstated the number and floor of his residence. We disagree. 
 Regarding the residence number, the District Court found that the apartment under 
investigation was Apartment #2, not #3 as Bagley contends. The District Court’s finding 
was supported by both information on Howard’s driver’s license and uncontroverted 
testimony from Special Agent Mark Kernan that there are only two mailboxes outside the 
relevant address. Bagley provided no contrary evidence, so the District Court’s 
conclusion was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d 
Cir. 2002).   
                                                 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 Regarding the floor, Bagley argues that the phrase “second floor” in the warrant 
was inaccurate in referencing a third-story apartment. App. 71. But the warrant also refers 
to the deli in the three-story building as being on the “ground floor,” not the first floor. Id. 
Accordingly, investigating agents could have readily inferred that the second floor 
corresponded to the third story.2 These circumstances are unlike those found in the cases 
cited by Bagley where the warrant described a residence other than the one searched. See, 
e.g., United States v. Bershchansky, 958 F. Supp. 2d 354, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (warrant 
naming Apartment #2 used to search an Apartment #1), aff’d 788 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 
2015); United States v. Trainor, 979 F. Supp. 933, 935 (D. Mass. 1997) (warrant naming 
street number 136 used to search number 138). 
 In addition, we agree with the District Court that even if the warrant were 
deficient, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply. “[T]he purpose 
of the exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct—[is not] furthered by suppressing 
evidence . . . ‘when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search 
warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.’” United States v. Tracey, 
597 F.3d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20 
                                                 
 2 The warrant was also executed by Agent Kernan, who knew from prior 
surveillance that the relevant apartment was on the top floor. It was therefore unlikely that 
any ambiguity in the warrant description would have confused officers. See United States 
v. Clement, 747 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir. 1984) (declining to invalidate search based on 
partial error in warrant’s description of residence where officers’ familiarity with 
residence ensured “no probability of a mistaken search”).  
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(1984)). Although we will not apply the good faith exception when a warrant is “so 
facially deficient that it failed to particularize the place to be searched,” Tracey, 597 F.3d 
at 151, any ambiguity in this warrant does not rise to that level. 
* * * 
 We will affirm the District Court’s judgment for the reasons stated. 
